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ÀÌdz½Ç Lee Poong Shil


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02-880-6221
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02-874-0126
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hbz2@snu.ac.kr
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½ºÅÄÆÛµå ´ëÇб³ (Stanford University) öÇйڻç (2017)
¼­¿ï´ëÇб³ öÇаú ´ëÇпø ¼­¾çöÇÐ Àü°ø ¹®Çм®»ç (2007)
¼­¿ï´ëÇб³ öÇаú ¹®Çлç (2005)
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°æÈñ´ëÇб³ öÇаú Á¶±³¼ö (2020.3-2024.8)
¼­¿ï´ëÇб³ öÇаú ½Ã°£°­»ç (2018.3-2020.2)
°æÈñ´ëÇб³ öÇаú ½Ã°£°­»ç (2018.3-2020.2)
¿¬¼¼´ëÇб³ öÇаú ½Ã°£°­»ç (2017.9-2018.12)
ÇѾç´ëÇб³ ±¹Á¦ÇкΠ½Ã°£°­»ç (2017.9-2017.12)
ÁÖ¿ä Àú¼­ ¹× ³í¹®
2022. ¡®Co-filing and de jure co-referential thought in the mental files framework.¡¯ Erkenntnis 87(1): 309-345 (DOI 10.1007/s10670-019-00196-1)
2021, ¡®On our understanding of singular negative statements: a defense of shallow pretense theory.¡¯ Philosophia 49: 2133-2155 (DOI 10.1007/s11406-021-00340-8)
2018, ¡®Mental Files, Concepts, and Bodies of Information.¡¯ Synthese 195(8): 3499-3518 (DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1381-4)

2022, ¡®°íÀ¯¸íÀÇ ÁöĪ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ À̸§»ç¿ë°üÇà Á᫐ À̷С¯, ¡ºÃ¶ÇС» 153Áý, Çѱ¹Ã¶ÇÐȸ (English title: ¡®A name-using-practice-based theory of reference about proper names¡¯)
2022, ¡®°íÀ¯¸í°ú À̸§»ç¿ë°üÇà¿¡ °üÇÑ ¼¼ÀÎÁ¸®ÀÇ ÁöĪ ÀÌ·Ð ºñÆÇ¡¯, ¡ºÃ¶ÇÐÀû ºÐ¼®¡» 48Áý, Çѱ¹ºÐ¼®Ã¶ÇÐȸ (English title: ¡®A critical discussion of Sainsbury¡¯s theory of reference about proper names and name-using practices¡¯)
2021, ¡®°íÀ¯¸íÀº ÀÚ¿¬¾ð¾î Ç¥ÇöÀÌ ¾Æ´Ñ°¡? –À¯Ã¢¼º ³íÁõ, ¹ø¿ªºÒ°¡´É¼º ³íÁõ, ±¹Áö¼º ³íÁõ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºñÆÇ-¡¯ ¡ºÃ¶Çлç»ó¡» 76, ¼­¿ï´ëÇб³ öÇлç»ó¿¬±¸¼Ò (English title: ¡®Are proper names not natural language expressions? –criticisms of the competence argument, the untranslatability argument, and the locality argument-¡¯)
2021, ¡®¸ÆŲÁöÀÇ Ã¥ÀÓÀü°¡±â¼ú±¸ Àü·«¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Àç°í¡¯ ¡ºÃ¶ÇС» 148Áý, Çѱ¹Ã¶ÇÐȸ (English title: ¡®A defense of McKinsey¡¯s theory of reference appealing to buck-passing descriptions¡¯)
2020, ¡°¿¡¹Ý½ºÀÇ Áö¹èÀû ¿øõ À̷аú µðÅ°ÀÇ ºñÆÇ¡± ¡ºÃ¶Çлç»ó¡» 76, ¼­¿ï´ëÇб³ öÇлç»ó¿¬±¸¼Ò (English title: ¡®Evans¡¯ dominant source theory and Dickie¡¯s criticism¡¯)
2020, ¡°°íÀ¯¸íÀº ÁöÇ¥»çÀΰ¡? –°íÀ¯¸í¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¸£Ä«³ªÆ¼ÀÇ ÁöÇ¥»ç ÀÌ·ÐÀÇ ¿ËÈ£-¡± ¡ºÃ¶ÇС» 145Áý, Çѱ¹Ã¶ÇÐȸ (English title: ¡®Are proper names indexicals? –a defense of Recanati¡¯s indexical theory of proper names¡¯)
2020, ¡°°íÀ¯¸íÀÇ »çȸ¼º –¹ß»ýÀû À̷аú °³ÀÎÁÖÀÇ À̷п¡ ´ëÇÑ ºñÆÇ¡± ¡ºÃ¶ÇС» 144Áý, Çѱ¹Ã¶ÇÐȸ (English title: ¡®The social character of proper names –a criticism of the genetic theory and the individualistic theory¡¯)
2019, ¡°´ÜĪ »ç°í¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±¸Ã¼ÀûÀÎ ÀÌ·Ð ¾ø´Â Ç¥ÁØÀû °íÀ¯¸í¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¼³¸íÀÇ ¹®Á¦Á¡ -ÃÖ¼ºÈ£ÀÇ »ç·Êµé¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºñÆÇÀû °íÂû¡± ¡ºÃ¶ÇÐÀû ºÐ¼®¡» 41Áý, Çѱ¹ºÐ¼®Ã¶ÇÐȸ (English title: ¡®A problem for an account of the nature of a proper name with no theory of singular thoughts: A discussion of Sungho Choi¡¯s examples in his theory of proper names¡¯)
2019, ¡°½ÉÀû ³»¿ë ¿ÜÀçÁÖÀÇ¿Í Æ¯±ÇÀû Á¢±Ù »çÀÌÀÇ ¾ç¸³ºÒ°¡´É¼º ¹®Á¦ -¸ÆŲÁöÀÇ ³íÁõ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºê·òÅ©³ÊÀÇ ºñÆÇÀÇ ½ÇÆС± ¡ºÃ¶ÇС» 139Áý, Çѱ¹Ã¶ÇÐȸ (English title: ¡®On the Incompatibility between Externalism about Mental Content and Privileged Access -Failure of Brueckner¡¯s Criticism of McKinsey¡¯s Argument¡¯)
2019, ¡°Á¸ÀçºÎÁ¤ Áø¼úÀÇ ¹ßÈ­ Áø¸®Á¶°Ç°ú ¾ç»óÀû ³»¿ëÀÇ ±¸ºÐ -Å©¸®¹Î½ºÀÇ ¾èÀº ôÇϱâ À̷п¡ ´ëÇÑ ºÎºÐÀû ¿ËÈ£¡± ¡ºÃ¶Çлç»ó¡» 72Áý, ¼­¿ï´ëÇб³ öÇлç»ó¿¬±¸¼Ò (English title: ¡®On the Distinction Between Utterance Truth-Condition and Modal Content -A Partial Defense of Crimmins¡¯ Theory of Shallow Pretense¡¯)
2018, ¡°Å©¸³Å°ÀÇ ´ºÅÏ/Á¶Áö ½º¹Ì½º ¹®Á¦ –°íÀ¯¸í¿¡ ´ëÇÑ À̸§»ç¿ë°üÇàÁ᫐ ÀÌ·ÐÀÇ Á¦¾È¡± ¡ºÃ¶ÇС», 137Áý, Çѱ¹Ã¶ÇÐȸ (English title: ¡®Kripke¡¯s Newton/George Smith problem and a naming-using-practice-based theory¡¯)
2018, ¡°°íÀ¯¸í°ú ´ÜĪ»ç°íÀÇ Àü´Þ: Á¦¼ÇÀÇ ÀÎÁöÁÖÀÇÀÇ ¹®Á¦Á¡¡± ¡ºÃ¶ÇÐÀû ºÐ¼®¡» 40Áý, Çѱ¹ºÐ¼®Ã¶ÇÐȸ (English title: ¡®Proper names and transmission of singular thought: a problem for Jeshion¡¯s Cognitivism¡¯)
2011, ¡°°æÇèÁÖÀÇ¿Í ºñ°³³äÁÖÀÇ¡± ¡ºÃ¶Çבּ¸¡», 94Áý, öÇבּ¸È¸ (English title: ¡®Empiricism and Non-conceptualism¡¯)
2010, ¡°ºñ°³³äÀû ³»¿ë°ú ¼øȯ¼º ³íÁõ¡± ¡ºÃ¶Çבּ¸¡», 88Áý, öÇבּ¸È¸ (English title: ¡®Non-conceptual content and circularity argument¡¯)
2009, ¡°ºñ°³³äÀû ³»¿ë°ú ¼¼¹Ð¼º ³íÁõ¡± ¡ºÃ¶ÇС», 99Áý, Çѱ¹Ã¶ÇÐȸ (English title: ¡®Non-conceptual content and fine-grainedness argument¡¯)

¹ø¿ª¼­: ¾ËÇÁ·¹µå, R. ¹Ð¸®. ÀÌdz½Ç ¿Å±è. (2022) <ÀÚÀ¯ÀÇÁö¿Í °úÇÐ –Çö´ë °úÇÐÀÌ ÀÚÀ¯ÀÇÁö°¡ Á¸ÀçÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ÀÔÁõÇÏÁö ¸øÇÑ ÀÌÀ¯>. ¼­¿ï: ÇʷμÒÇÈ.
(Translation: Mele, Alfred R. 2014. Free: why science hasn¡¯t disproved free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.)